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Book Reviews: AMERICAN POLITICS December 2001 
classifications we learn that (1) the majority of vetoes occur 
over minor bills (56%); (2) vetoes of landmark and important 
legislation usually occur in veto chains (65%); and (3) most 
vetoes of minor legislation are final (70%), that is, there are 
no other bills or vetoes regarding the matter. 
The book is quite comprehensive in its coverage, but there 
is no mention of the line-item veto. Every president since 
Jimmy Carter has asked for the authority to single out items 
for veto on spending bills after signing the other parts of the 
bill. Congress gave this power to the president in 1996, but in 
1998 the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in Clinton 
v. City of New York. The issue is important, as 43 of the 50 
governors have line-item veto power. 
All students of the presidency and Congress should read 
this book. The importance of the findings and the breadth of 
the original data collected and interpreted alone make it 
worth reading. This should be required reading in graduate 
courses on the presidency and on legislative behavior. It is 
also an excellent example of how to do rational choice 
research and do it well. The book is probably not appropriate 
for most undergraduates, especially those who have not been 
exposed to formal theory, although advanced undergraduates 
would benefit from the findings in chapter 2, based on data 
from the post-World War II era. 
Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice: An Exploration 
of Local Governance. By James C. Clingermayer and 
Richard C. Feiock. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2001. 151p. $17.95 paper. 
David R. Elkins, Cleveland State University 
For more than twenty years, urban scholars have debated 
whether economic determinism and its fiscal implications 
trump municipal political action in local government policy 
choices. In a very real sense, the debate is about whether 
local politics matters. Somewhat lost in this discussion, 
although not entirely, is an issue that was once at the 
forefront of urban scholarship: the role of institutional 
structures. With the maturing theoretical interest in the new 
institutionalism, the time is ripe to revisit this area and 
determine whether institutional structures matter. According 
to James Clingermayer and Richard Feiock, they do. 
The term "exploration" in the subtitle is an apt description 
of this work. Using seven separate data sets (three are 
derived from the authors' surveys conducted during the 
1980s, three from 1980 Census data, and one from the 
International City Management Association for 1988), the 
authors explore issues as diverse as economic development 
decision making, municipal practices associated with zoning, 
citizen-initiated contacts and casework activities of council 
members, contracting out for services, and debt financing 
decisions. In addition, they explore how external constraints 
associated with annexation policy, exclusionary zoning prac- 
tices, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affect municipal 
policymaking. The breadth of the empirical analysis makes a 
convincing case that urban scholars should seriously consider 
the role urban institutional structures have in shaping local 
policy decisions. Indeed, Clingermayer and Feiock hope that 
their work will reenergize research in this area. 
The authors define institutionalism as the "formal and 
informal rules operating within or across organizations" (p. 
2). In their analysis of municipal governments, they place 
great emphasis on the formal rules of institutions. It is argued 
that institutions are important because they provide stability, 
shape choice sets, and structure decision making. Specifically, 
"electoral rules and constituency boundaries affect policy 
makers' behaviors by determining what sorts of voters they 
must please if they are to remain in office or rise to higher 
office" (p. vii). Although the research is firmly anchored in 
the new institutionalism, there is also a strong linkage, which 
the authors readily acknowledge, to the classics in this field. 
The effects of institutional features on municipal economic 
development activities are examined from several angles. 
First, the authors explore how differences in structural fea- 
tures, particularly those of elected officials, are associated 
with five separate economic development policies and prac- 
tices. Second, they ask whether the adoption of comprehen- 
sive zoning is attributable to either market failure or distrib- 
utive politics. Third, they turn to the question of how 
institutional structures shape development-based constituen- 
cy-related experiences of council members. The conclusion is 
that institutional structures do matter with regard to these 
varied economic development activities, but institutional 
effects are subtle. 
Clingermayer and Feiock also examine the decision-mak- 
ing effects of turnover in leadership and council membership. 
They propose two general explanations for the influence of 
turnover on local policymaking. The first suggests that private 
organizations involved in negotiations with a city that has a 
high level of turnover may be apprehensive about the city's 
ability to fulfill long-term obligations, and this political 
uncertainty drives up the transaction costs associated with 
negotiations. The second explanation hinges on the attempt 
by elected officials to avoid blame for potentially controver- 
sial decisions or to concentrate benefits to enhance political 
prospects. Clingermayer and Feiock find support, albeit 
weak, for both explanations but along an intriguing faultline. 
They find that administrative turnover is inversely associated 
with the level of services contracted out and that mayoral 
turnover is directly associated with contracting out. Also, in 
cities with council-manager structures, turnover in council 
membership is inversely associated with various measures of 
municipal debt. 
Finally, the authors explore how state and federal decisions 
affect municipal policymaking. Their analysis of annexation 
and exclusionary zoning suggests that state-level attempts to 
limit the discretionary authority of local officials have largely 
succeeded. They also find that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
reduced the level of municipal revenue bond debt. 
The book is not without flaws. The use of multiple data sets 
and methods creates a trade-off between breadth of analysis 
and continuity of argument. The authors remain focused on 
the exploration of the institutional dynamics of municipal 
policymaking, but the book seems to lack the unified theme 
typical of research based on fewer data sources. In some 
instances it seems this is a collection of discrete articles, with 
little connection between one chapter or section and another. 
The book would have benefited from an appendix with 
details about the various data sets, the construction of 
variables, and some of the statistical problems associated 
with the analyses. For instance, regarding citizen-initiated 
contacts, Clingermayer and Feiock note that "usable re- 
sponses were received from 234 council members" (p. 39), 
but the statistical analysis refers to an N of 177 (p. 41). Why 
were so many cases dropped? Although I am inclined to find 
brevity a virtue, further development of some ideas would 
have been helpful. For instance, the discussion of time 
horizons is intriguing and warrants elaboration. 
These criticisms should not dissuade urban scholars from 
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reading this worthwhile contribution. It undoubtedly will be 
cited among the classics in the institutional-structural expla- 
nations of municipal policymaking. Indeed, drawing on this 
earlier generation of scholarship, Clingermayer and Feiock 
conclude that institutions matter but in ways that "mediate 
and interact with other factors" to influence outcomes (p. 
123). Whether Clingermayer and Feiock accomplish their 
goal of reinvigorating the institutional perspective in urban 
scholarship remains to be seen, but their exploration is a 
critical first step. 
Empire on the Hudson: Entrepreneurial Vision and Political 
Power at the Port of New York Authority. By Jameson W. 
Doig. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 620p. $49.50. 
Steven P. Erie, University of California, San Diego 
Empire on the Hudson is a dual biography of the Port of New 
York Authority, America's first semiautonomous, self-financ- 
ing public development agency, which helped inspire the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, and of the individuals who 
shaped it. It is also much more. This case study of local 
government's catalytic role in regional economic develop- 
ment is a major contribution to the twentieth-century history 
of the New York metropolitan region. In an era when 
bureaucracy has become synonymous with failed government 
programs, the Port Authority is a valuable reminder of the 
positive contributions that public agencies can make. It also 
serves as a useful prism through which the author views and 
critiques relevant theories of political leadership. 
Doig shows that the Port of New York Authority, char- 
tered in 1921 by the states of New York and New Jersey, was 
a latter-day child of the Progressive reform impulse of the 
early twentieth century, which sought rational planning by an 
activist government, purged of corruption and infused with 
"business-like" efficiency. The initial impetus was the fear 
that the region's magnificent waterfront might lose its pre- 
eminent status to other East Coast ports because of the 
additional time and costs entailed by docking facilities lo- 
cated mostly in New York but rail terminals located mostly in 
New Jersey. 
The newly created authority did, indeed, have a life of its 
own. From the 1920s through the 1950s, it evolved from the 
relatively narrow mission of rail-freight planning to a much 
broader mandate to build and operate bridges and tunnels, 
assume the dominant role in regional air transport (at 
Newark, LaGuardia, and Kennedy), and construct a contain- 
erized marine terminal, a gigantic mid-Manhattan bus termi- 
nal, and a new arterial highway system. 
The financial underpinnings of this "imperial" bureaucracy 
were the bridge and toll revenues that allowed the authority 
to self-finance most of its capital projects by issuing revenue 
bonds rather than depend on local and state governments for 
funding. In classic survival-of-the-fittest fashion, it success- 
fully fought off challenges from both within and without the 
region. New York Mayor John F. Hylan in the 1920s mobi- 
lized Tammany Hall against the Port Authority, but he was 
forced into retirement by the authority's good friend, Gov- 
ernor Al Smith. Robert Moses, the region's well-connected 
transportation "power broker," tried unsuccessfully to block 
the authority's new airport management role as well as its 
Manhattan bus terminal, but he later cooperated with the 
authority on bridge and highway improvements. Earlier, 
there was a serious challenge from Washington when the 
New Deal attempted to end the tax-exempt status of munic- 
ipal bonds. This was defeated by a nationwide, ostensibly 
"grassroots" campaign skillfully orchestrated from the offices 
of the Port Authority. 
Doig quotes Ralph Waldo Emerson's aphorism that insti- 
tutions are "the lengthened shadow of one man" but credits 
three individuals. Julius Henry Cohen, the authority's general 
counsel from 1921 until 1942, first emerged into prominence 
as a garment industry lawyer who promoted the Brandeisian 
cause of commercial arbitration of labor disputes. He carried 
his cooperative principles into the public sector and crystal- 
lized the idea of bi-state partnership embodied in the 1921 
Port Compact. Swiss-born Othmar H. Ammann, the author- 
ity's chief engineer from 1928 to 1939, lobbied for, designed, 
and supervised the construction of the George Washington 
Bridge and the Lincoln Tunnel. He returned in the 1950s to 
design the second deck of that bridge as well as the new 
Throgs Neck Bridge and the Verrazano-Narrow spans. The 
third creative bureaucrat was Austin J. Tobin, the authority's 
assistant attorney and then its executive director. A graduate 
of Holy Cross College who lost his interest in theology, he 
committed himself to the authority as a crusade. He ran the 
campaign that defeated the aforementioned New Deal policy 
in the 1930s and then field marshaled the authority's new 
initiatives in the 1940s and 1950s as airport manager, bus 
terminal operator, and highway engineer. 
The author impartially documents not only the authority's 
successes but also its failures and periods of drift and 
retrenchment. In the 1920s, the authority was fought to a 
standstill by the dozen railroads that served the metropolitan 
region and had no interest in centralizing their competitive 
operations. Declining revenues during the Depression and 
the early years of World War II coincided with the ascen- 
dancy of Frank C. Ferguson as Port Authority chairman. A 
conservative investment banker, he focused his tunnel-vision 
on balance-sheet considerations. Tobin's career from the late 
1950s to his abrupt retirement in 1971 (after alienating 
governors of both states) was a mixed bag. His successes in 
constructing new bridges and highways were counterbalanced 
by a financially disastrous mass transit experiment, the bil- 
lion-dollar grandiosity of the World Trade Center project, 
and the defeat of a proposed jetport in northern New Jersey. 
Doig's concluding chapter covers in less detail the embat- 
tled post-Tobin era. Since the 1970s, the authority has 
alternated between "malaise" or retrenchment and contro- 
versial new initiatives that the author views as disguised 
attempts to divert its revenues into nontransportation 
projects run by local and state politicians. Critics, including 
New York Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, want to scrap the 
authority, but Doig hopes for a rebirth of creative leadership 
in the twenty-first century. 
This gracefully written book is a significant contribution to 
the literature. Doig offers a useful corrective to Robert 
Caro's (The Power Broker, 1974) understandable overempha- 
sis of the omnipotence of his protagonist, Robert Moses. 
Doig also provides a sensible critique of James Q. Wilson's 
view that public bureaucracies invariably are passive respond- 
ers, of necessity driven by external forces, rather than proac- 
tive movers of events, motivated by creativity and innovation 
emanating from within. Finally, Doig gives deserved atten- 
tion to the ethical dimension of public leadership, specifically 
the need to balance organizational efficiency with democratic 
accountability. In so doing, Empire on the Hudson joins the 
front rank of scholarship on public enterprise and enterpris- 
ing public entrepreneurs. 
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